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The economic relationship between the United States and
Japan has undergone significant changes recently, causing
changes and repercussion beyond international economics,
including U.S. military budgeting. The U.S. Navy's present
system of budgeting for overseas activities assumes stable
exchange rates. Fluctuating exchange rates are now basic
to the operation of the International Financial System. It
is proposed that budgeting be done using a target rate, with
fluctuations above and below that rate going into general
Treasury receipts or supplemented by a specific appropria-
tion, as the case may be. Otherwise, local overseas com-
manders have budgets nearly totally dependent upon exchange
rates, which can convert the original intent of the granted
budget when the dollar's value varies in either direction.
This problem is particularly acute in Japan when the
dollar's value has changed drastically and often, and where
the Navy has a significant presence.
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I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE
The U.S. military forces in Japan and Germany are the
successors to the post-World War II Allied occupation. No
longer occupation troops, instead, the U.S. military
presence in Japan and Germany is a projection of power over-
seas unprecedented in not only the history of the United
States, but of the world.
When Japan and Germany were near collapse economically
while the United States was the towering economic giant, the
posting of American forces in those two nations was an eco-
nomic benefit for all concerned. The infusion of U.S. dol-
lars through the forces stationed there helped bolster their
economies, which aided the United States as well as the
devastated countries. By the time Japan and Germany had
become economic powers in their own right, the financial
implications of the foreign forces in their nations, not to
mention the political trauma they caused, since no nation
enjoys alien soldiers and sailors in their midst, were irri-
tating and a source of concern. But now that the United
States is suffering economic difficulties, in particular,
vis-a-vis these two countries, the impact of the U.S. forces
overseas becomes a deleterious factor in the international
monetary equation.
Due to the economic difficulties of the United States,
the dollar has also become less highly prized. Since the
dollar's devaluation and the discontinuance of fixed

exchange parities the price of U.S. currency has varied from
day to day. This has resulted in two immediate problems for
the Department of Defense. First, it is now much more costly
to operate in foreign currencies overseas (besides inflation
and rising costs in general). Secondly, costs may vary
greatly since during any fiscal year the value of the dollar
varies daily; a budget in dollar terms can only be an
approximation at best.
Japan and Germany were chosen for this study primarily
because they have continually experienced a significant U.S.
military presence (they rank number one and two in U.S.
military expenditures), have had considerably currency
appreciation absolutely and in U.S. dollar terms, and are
major trading partners of the United States. Together they
account for nearly one-half of all U.S. military expenditure
overseas. (See Table 18.)
The U.S. dollar has suffered a considerable decline in
value in recent years, while both the Japanese yen and the
German mark have appreciated dramatically. From the effec-
tive ending of fixed currency rates in August 1971 to
October 1973, the dollar's value to the yen and mark has
declined by over 51 and 49 percent, respectively. (Also,
the 1969 revaluation of the mark means an even steeper
decline in the relative value of the dollar from that point -
over 56 percent. See Tables 34 and 35)
.
Finally, both Japan and Germany are important trading
partners of the United States. Over the last ten years.

exports to Japan and Germany constituted 13 percent to 17
percent of total U.S. exports. (See Table 16.) In imports,
the relationship is even more pronounced: the range has
been 17 to 24 percent of total U.S. imports. (See Table
17.) By far the lion's share of our recent deficits in
trade and payments has been accounted for by unfavorable
balances with Japan and Germany. (See Table 13.) Mean-
while, the trend of the U.S. unfavorable balance of trade
and balance of payments has become increasingly worse. (See
Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5.)
The main emphasis of this study is on Japan. There are
a variety of reasons for this emphasis. First, as men-
tioned previously, the dollar has declined slightly more
against the Japanese yen than against the German Federal
Republic, or West German, mark. Moreover, in the past few
months, the fall of the dollar has been most dramatic
against the yen. In the period March to October 1978, the
dollar-yen rate reached a new record low on twenty-nine
occasions. (See Tables 34 and 35.) (The dollar also hit
sixteen new lows against the mark during the same period,
indicative of the dollar's plight overall.) During the
course of research for this study over the calendar year of
1978, this subject became a very topical, even critical,
item of extreme interest, especially the dollar-yen rate
and the United States — Japan balance of payments and
balance of trade.
Second, imports from Japan have been significantly
higher than those from Germany; in the past ten years, the
8

value of imports from Japan have been double to triple
those from Germany. (See Table 17.)
The United States Navy's overseas financial presence is
largest in Japan. In the past ten years, Japan has always
been the leading country in U.S. Navy overseas expenditures.
Besides, the trend has been for even a larger percentage of
the Navy's overseas expenditures going to Japan. (See
Tables 40, 41 and 42.) At the same time, the cost of doing
business in Japan has soared nearly ten-fold. (See Table
43.) This rising cost is in large part due to the multiple
effects of rising labor costs, currency revaluations
(Tables 34 and 35), and Japanese domestic inflation, which
has caused prices to double in a decade. (See Tables 32 and
33.)
Finally, information and statistics, on both a formal
and informal basis, were more readily available on Navy and
Defense Department expenditures in Japan than any other
country. This is probably attributable to the author's
background and contacts in the Navy in general and in
Defense activities in Japan in particular. Also, Japanese
official and semi-official sources usually were much more
co-operative and yielded a plethora of useful information,
in contrast to reticent German sources.
On a land mass the same size as the state of Montana,
Japan supports the sixth largest population in the world.
It has a larger population than France and Great Britain
combined. More than 111 million people inhabit the four

major islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku, as
well as the thousands of smaller islands which make up this
Asian nation. This densely crowded country is made even
smaller by the mountains which cover 8 percent of the land,
pushing the population, agriculture, and industry into the
limited habitable areas. A third of the Japanese live in
the megalopolis that sprawls four hundred miles from Tokyo
to Osaka.
Not only does this chain of islands provide very little
living and working room for its inhabitants, it also has few
of the natural resources normally needed by an industrial
nation. Japan imports 99 percent of her iron ore, 81 per-
cent of her coking coal, 99 percent of her crude oil, all
aluminum, nickel, and cobalt, and most copper and lead.
Even 27 percent of Japan's food must be purchased from other
countries
.
Yet, this small island nation, with few raw materials
or energy resources, has become one of the most productive
countries in the world. Since 1968, Japan has ranked third,
behind the United States and the Soviet Union, in the volume
of goods and services produced. Bereft of economic
resources, Japan made itself the world's greatest "value
adding machine." Buying raw materials from all over the
world, she shapes them into automobiles, ships, and indus-
trial machines that find their way to every market on earth.
On a land mass one-twenty-fifth the size of the United
States, and with a population half as large, Japan has been
10

able to produce one-third as much agriculturally as the
United States, making her, acre for acre, the most produc-
tive patch of earth in the world. Of course, population





In only one century, the United States and Japan have
formed very close economic, political, and cultural ties
across the Pacific, notwithstanding periods of severe
political and military conflict. The relationship between
the two countries formally began in 1853, when Commodore
Matthew C. Perry led a naval expedition to Japan to induce
the ruling Tokugawa Shogunate to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States. He returned the following
year to negotiate a treaty. This agreement signaled an end
to Japan's more than two centuries of self-imposed
isolation.
Townsend Harris became the first American consul in
Japan in 1856. Four years later, the Shogunate dispatched a
diplomatic mission to the United States, and, in 1870, a
Japanese consulate was opened in San Francisco. The reign
of Emperor Meiji that began in 186 8 saw dramatic changes in
Japan. In order to strengthen his nation as it entered a
new epoch, the young emperor embraced foreign ideas,
declaring, "knowledge shall be sought all over the world."
Meiji is the grandfather of the present emperor, Hirohito
(who will be known as Showa after his reign ends), illustrat-
ing the truly recent entry of Japan into the modern world.
From an insular agrarian country, Japan rapidly
absorbed western ideas and technology which transformed her
into an important industrial state by the turn of the
12

century. As Will Rogers observed, "America knocked on the
door of Asia, but she didn't go in. Japan came out." After
World War II, the United States played a key role in Japan's
successful effort to rebuild her shattered economy. The
terra "economic miracle" is often used to describe Japan's
post-war recovery and rise to economic prominence in less
than two decades. The post-war United States-Japan alliance
has been fortified by trade, investment, and cultural and
political exchanges.
Symbolic of this trans-Pacific relationship are the
nearly one million Japanese and American tourists who
annually made the journey across the Pacific recently. For
the last several years, by far the largest percentage of
foreign travelers in Japan each year were from the United
States, and Japanese also lead all overseas visitors to the
United States. (Canada and Mexico are not considered
"overseas" in relation to the United States; they are of
course the countries whose citizens visit the United States
the most.
)
Although the trade relationship between the United
States and Japan is only one century old, it matured rela-
tively quickly. Trade progressed so rapidly between the
two countries that by the Meiji Restoration in 1868, only
14 years after Commodore Perry negotiated a trade treaty
with Japan, the United States had become Japan's largest
export market.
In 1880, the trade volume between the United States and
Japan was less than $15 million. Today, these two countries
13

enjoy the largest overseas trade relationship in the world,
with total trade of over $29 billion in 1977. While the
United States sustained close to an $8 billion trade deficit
with Japan in 1977, a campaign has been mounted in Japan to
promote more U.S. import in an effort to maintain a more
equitable trade balance.
Not only has the volume of trade changed drastically,
but so have the commodities traded since 1880. Then, Japan
exported such traditional products as tea, fans, and
lacquer ware, while the United States exported petroleum,
clocks, and ironware. Today, iron and steel, electrical
machinery, and transport equipment form the bulk of U.S.
imports from Japan. The United States sends m.ostly wood
and lumber, corn, and coal to Japan. These are symbolic of
Japan's dependence on food and resources. (See Tables 36
and 37.)
Japan is the largest overseas market for U.S. products.
(Canada is the U.S.' largest trading partner.) American
agricultural exports to Japan totaled $3.3 billion in 1976.
This represented about 15 percent of the total U.S. export
of farm products.
While the United States remains Japan's biggest market,
the percentage of Japan's exports going to the United States
has decreased remarkably in this decade. In 1971, over 30
percent of Japan's exports went to the United States, while
in 1975 this figure fell to 20 percent (though creeping up
again). Japan's export policy has been to diversify her
14

markets; now Japan's trade with developing nations and
communist countries exceeds her trade with developed areas,
largely because of higher prices for oil and raw materials.
Yet the United States remains Japan's preeminent trading
partner.
Japan's restrictive import policy is a source of some
irritation. However, trade barriers have fallen recently,
and today Japan can be classified among free-trade nations.
The number of general category items under Japan's residual
import restrictions, v/hich totaled 118 at the end of 1969,




Japanese society and, by extension, industry, stresses
the importance of harmonious relations among individuals.
While Americans have recently been concerned with personal
rights — civil rights, women's rights, right to privacy,
right to know — they will sue each other frequently. The
Japanese, on the other hand, rarely sue each other. They
seek and achieve a remarkable degree of harmony among all
aspects of their society and culture, even in business
enterprises
.
This human relations linkage means that the tie that
binds the corporate chief executive to the bottom-rung
workers of his firm is strong, far firmer than the Ameri-
can's concept of paternalism, while the reverse upward is
far stronger than mere company loyalty. A web of inter-
dependent relationships permeates all levels of a Japanese
corporation. The entire identity of an employee is with
his company. There are company songs, company retreats,
company tours. There is generally lifetime employment
(individuals who have left an employer are viewed suspi-
ciously by other potential employers) and few strikes. One
of the first questions Japanese ask each other upon meeting
for the first time is, "Whom do you work for?"
Japan was affected more seriously by the oil embargo
and raw materials shortage of 1974-75 than any other world
economic power since Japan imports virtually all of those
16

commodities. Since the "oil shokku" Japan has built up its
inventories of raw material to alleviate a similar situation
in the future. Japanese industry kept on producing even as
world demand softened, partly to avoid unemployment, partly
because of a miscalculation of the speed and extend of the
eventual recovery. This excess production caused an export
drive by "Japan, Incorporated" while keeping domestic
prices high. The higher returns from domestic sales, in a
sense, are being used to compensate for lower returns from
exports
.
The Japanese have captured great shares of various
American markets. There are a variety of items: auto-
mobiles, television sets, steel, textiles, pens, whiskey,
beer, zippers and soy sauce. Two million color televisions
and 1.4 million cars were imported in 1977. The Japanese
have over 13 percent of the U.S. car market, and 30 percent
of the color TV market.
The Japanese government, always in concert with the
business community, forming what is popularly known as
"Japan Incorporated," actively encourages exports. The U.S.
government, in contrast, has a multitude of export rules and
regulations. These rules and regulations are probably
disproportionally influential since most U.S. export
companies are relatively small. Although a vigorous export-
promotion drive is now undeirway, most American companies are
uncertain how to exploit offshore markets and, perhaps,
unconvinced that they should bother trying.
17

Exports have never been a prime consideration for most
American companies. For one thing, profits have not
depended on them. With the world's largest society of
conspicuous consumers
,
plus efficient transportation and
distribution, the United States has been a natural, familiar
market for American corporations. They have been able to
prosper without having to cope with different ways of doing
business around the world. The traditional American busi-
ness attitude, particularly by large corporations (even
"multinational" ones), has regarded exports as little more
than bonuses on top of domestic sales, which is where the
main emphasis always has been. In addition, there is an
impatient reluctance to do as the Japanese do and spend the
time and money required to establish a beachhead abroad and
to gradually expand market share at the expense of short-
term profitability. However, there is a considerable U.S.
business presence overseas, though not in the form of
exported products as it is in the case of Japan. Instead,
it is in offshore m.anufacturing units, such as overseas
affiliates
.
Presently, a United States government export license
is required for any sale of technical products that exceeds
$2200. It generally takes two months to complete the paper-
work, and that delay frequently prevents U.S. firms from
making timely sales. Also, the export license requirement
is used to veto sales of what the government considers
"sensitive" technology, but what the American trading firm
18

views as a sale that a foreign competitor will make if it
does not.
The Liberal Democratic Party has ruled Japan since
soon after World War II. A mainstay of the LDP is agri-
cultural interests. So, even though agricultural products
are one of the few groups of U.S. export items to Japan
could be profitably expanded, the Japanese farmers vehe-
mently oppose this, and their influence in the government
is significant.
Agricultural leaders recently told United States
Ambassador Mansfield, former Senate majority leader, that
Japanese farmers are strongly opposed to an expension of
American agricultural imports. The Central Union of Agri-
cultural Cooperatives flatly stated it could not agree to
any change in the present Japanese system of importing (or,
to be more precise, not importing) agricultural goods in
short supply.
Japan's protective tariff on computers is indicative
of the government's posture toward imports. In 197 6, invest-
ment and import restrictions were removed. Yet, a tariff
of 13.5 percent is levied on central-processor units and
22.5 percent on peripheral equipment, a rate one U.S.
official says "is three times the rate charged by all other
advanced nations in the world." Very substantial domestic
development is proceeding behind this barrier.
Since the "post-OPEC" recession of 1973-74, the United
States has been pumping up its economy for domestic reasons
19

as well as to help lead the world out of recession while
Germany and Japan have resisted, fearful of inflation.
This has aggravated the dollar's plight.
The United States and its economy are parochial and
insulated. The rest of the world may not be that much
more dependent on world trade, but the rest of the world
is certainly more aware of international trade. The United
States and the various segments of its economy have
generally not been cognizant and observant of world eco-
nomics and their role in it.
The United States has a relatively solid, expansive
economy that can generally absorb its own output (thus, not
"compelling" exports) and more — meaning imports are
marketable. In this manner, the huge U.S. economy wields
a double-edged sword. Inherent in it is this two-way,
complementary effect — less need to export more ability to
import. It is parochial in that the U.S. government has
recently been more concerned with unemployment than infla-
tion, keeping the economy going at a strong rate and able to
continue to absorb imports and avoid a need to export.
Inflation in the American economy contributes directly
to a devaluation of the dollar, since inflation is basically
a cheapening of money. Of course, other factors are
reflected in the fall of the dollar since Japan's inflation
has been worse than the United States. (See Tables 32 and
33.) However, domestic inflation increases the costs and
prices of goods, making them less competitive in the world
20

market and exaggerating the trade imbalance. It is fair to
say that without Japan's higher inflation rate, its trade
balance with the United States would be even more unbalanced.
The United States trade imbalance has two additional
factors vis-a-vis Japan and Germany. While both Japan and
Germany have to import a significant amount of petroleum and
a much higher percentage of their total consumption than the
United States, the United States still imports more than
Japan and Germany combined. (See Tables 2 4 and 25.) Also,
the United States has significant military expenditures
overseas, while Japan and Germany have virtually none.
(See Tables 18 and 19.)
As in any modern industrial country, the Japanese face
certain problems in stimiulating their economy. Over-
stimulation can result in inflation, and Japan has had great
inflation in recent years. (See Tables 32 and 33.) At the
same time, the Japanese domestic market cannot absorb its
industry's output; Japan is forced to produce to avoid
unemployment and forced to absorb that production.
Additionally, the Japanese have developed large scale
industrial units in order to benefit from economics of
scale and learning curves . They have thus , as have the
Germans, deliberately built the steel shipbuilding, auto-
mobile,, and electronics industries much larger than their
economy can absorb. The result is that exports are both a
residual consequence of this expansion and a major reason
for it in the first place.
21

The West German government will not take additional
steps to speed its economic growth because it fears infla-
tion. Germany still recalls its horrible inflations of the
early 1920 's and immediately after World War II. The con-
sensus of both German public opinion and government leaders
is that inflation is not acceptable. The United States has
not had a comparable experience, except that of the Southern
Confederacy during its brief life in the American Civil War.
German Economic Minister Lambsdorff wrote in the New York
Times on March 2, 1978 that, "In its economic-policy
efforts, the German government has approached the limits of
what is feasible in political and economic terms." Though
the Japanese are their proverbially somewhat less scrutable
selves, the indications are that the Japanese government has
a similar attitude.
Japan set a 6.7 percent growth target for 1977 to
alleviate its export pressure. Since growth was 5.1 percent,
the export pressures continued. The growth of the national
economy, measured by Gross National Product, has been one
of the hopes of the United States to enable Japan and
Germany to achieve more internal absorption of their own
products. Yet, the economies of Japan and Germany have not
grown nearly fast enough compared to the United States to do
this. Of course, the reverse is also possible, a slowdown
in the United States economy could lessen demand for imports,
but that is not feasible in an absolute sense, only in a
relative one — compared to Germany and Japan. (See Table
22

31.) An expansive domestic economy is one method of cor-
recting Japan's trade imbalance. Instead, problems in the
domestic market mean even more emphasis on the export market.
The fall of the dollar and other foreign currencies in
relation to a strong yen has not helped Japanese consumers
buy imported goods at lower prices. There is not at this
time a market readily expandable and import distributors
have generally not lowered prices. According to some
Japanese officials, consumers have not felt the benefits of
reduced import prices because the lowered costs of imports
have been countered by overall domestic inflation. This may
be particularly true since Japan's imports are mainly raw
materials. Yet, there have been windfall profits for
Japanese companies, which they have generally kept rather
than pass on to consumers. An embryo consumers' movement
has campaigned against the lack of price decreases. The
Japanese cultural tradition of accepting authority and of
not challenging established institutions hinders develop-
ment of such a movement.
Also, imported consumed goods are not a large factor in
the Japanese economy. Thus, even a significant price reduc-
tion in imported goods can be lost in the sea of Japan-
produced items. At the same time, the government position is
that profits should be used for capital investment. This
type of public sector farsightedness has been one of the
prime factors in Japan's long-run economic prowess.
Regardless, imports are not expected to grow too quickly.
More than 90 percent of several vital commodities — wheat,
23

soybeans, iron ore, copper, and crude oil — are imported,
but economists do not see any substantial increase in demand
The Japanese distribution system is complex. It
requires a determined effort to break into it and understand
it. Of course, the Japanese have done precisely that in
foreign markets, especially in the United States. There
really has not been a parallel determined effort by American
business in general, though there have been exceptions to
prove the rule, to penetrate the Japanese market.
Japan is not an importer's market. The trade balance
of Japan is mainly attributable to her aggressive exporting,
but the other side of the balance is also a factor: Japan
imports a very small amount of consumer goods. The import
market, such as it is, is quite narrow. The Japanese have
a mania for certain foreign products and will pay top dollar
(yen) for them. There are a variety of reasons why imported
items are so expensive in Japan. The basic one underlying
everything is the simple law of supply and demand. A
limited amount is imported, so its price is bid up. The
social status attached to imported, expensive (perhaps a
redundant use of terms regarding Japan) items raises the
price further. Such items as expensive golf clubs and high
priced whiskeys are staples of the import market. Interest-
ingly, Japanese whiskey is probably just as tasty, but the
expensive foreign liquor served to guests is an indication
of the host's honoring his guests. Yet, this type of market
is quite limited. Importers in Japan must compete in the
24

larger consumer market, as Japanese imports in the United
States do, if the market is to become a mass one.
Foreign businessmen complain that the Japanese govern-
ment has devised a wide range of rules and practices
designed to insulate domestic business from foreign competi-
tion. There are many regulations to control the marketplace
and maintain harmony in the economy. This sense of equilib-
rium is not purposely a weapon against foreigners, since
the Japanese must abide by it, too, but is a part of the
Japanese national character.
The independent contractor, Japanese or foreign, who
defies the system, trying to avoid the extra costs of
brokers and traders, risks the wrath of the larger trading
firms and retailers themselves, who may refuse to display
the imports on their shelves. The spirit of "girl," or
obligation, is also strong. Japanese businessmen are
reluctant to cut their ties with their traditional domestic
suppliers, even when Japanese does import, and they also
suspect that foreign suppliers would be unreliable in a
crisis. (They have been burned once before in that respect.)
For example, the weakness of the dollar has given many
American products a distinct price edge in Japan. Yet
demand for United States products has increased only slightly,
so loyal are local manufacturers and retailers to their





The Japanese, and some knowledgeable Americans, criti-
cize American exporters for not trying hard enough and for
making little effort to understand the special techniques
of selling in Japan. U.S. manufacturers, they argue, not
only are inexperienced with exporting in general, they are
also reluctant to try to deal with the linguistic and cul-
tural barriers that must be overcome. As Robert Strauss,
President Carter's Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, has said, "Unquestionably, a big part of our problem
is our lack of skills in selling abroad. If the Japanese
removed every barrier tomorrow, we'd still have a very hard
time selling over there."
On the other hand, the Japanese are at home when it
comes to exports. They study a market completely, including
regulations involved, and make a determined effort to con-
form to local conditions. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier,
U.S. firms seem to have a cavalier attitude toward foreign
markets, an attitude that can no longer suffice. For
example, electrical items must be converted to Japanese cur-
rent; Japanese exports to the United States do this auto-
matically. Japanese tastes have become increasingly
Westernized, and perseverance should enable U.S. companies
to get a foothold.
Compared to their American counterparts, Japanese
people and their homes are smaller, and their tastes reflect
a different culture. American refrigerators simply will not
fit in Japanese homes. Most American furniture is too large
26

and too bulky for the typical Japanese house. They need
smaller pieces, designed to meet Japanese tastes. Few
Japanese could find room for the standard size American
washer and dryer. The Japanese need right-hand drive cars;
but the United States makes only left-hand drive models.
(Of course Japanese vehicles exported to the United States
conform precisely to American requirements.) The American
exporting attitude continues to be figuratively "dump it on
the pier" with a take-it-or-leave-it approach. Meanwhile,
the Japanese make a concerted effort to penetrate a market,
studying demography, regulations, tastes, and advertising.
Although in absolute terms, American productivity
(output per hour) compares quite favorably in most indus-
tries with the rest of the world, its growth in this
important attribute has lagged. The United States now
trails behind many other developed countries in manufactur-
ing-productivity growth, particularly German and Japan,
The rate of productivity growth (how fast industry is able
to increase its output against hours worked) is the key to
true economic growth and expansion and real gains in wages 7
if wage increases exceed productivity increases, domesti-
cally-induced inflation almost certainly follows. Also,
differing rates of productivity growth among nations will
change the relative competitiveness of their products in
international markets. (See Table 3 0.)
There are several factors in the relatively slow rate
of U.S. productivity growth. The American worker has become
27

a "time thief," using "company" time for a variety of per-
sonal business concerns. According to one estimate, this
time thievery has a price tag of $80 billion a year, a drag
on productivity, to say the least. The large influx of
women and baby-boom young people — less experienced
workers — into the labor force has been part of it. Also,
inflation itself, an effect of lowering productivity, can
contribute to its cause. Inflation discourages business
investment in new plant and equipment, since it makes it
difficult to plan ahead, and forces up interest rates, mak-
ing it difficult to plan ahead, and forces up interest rates,
making it costly to borrow investment funds. Industry has
also had to clean itself up and to meet the rush of new
health and safety standards. Finally, in some segments of
U.S. industry the plants are old, such as the steelmakers'
aging, but expensive to replace, mills.
The simple ubiquity of the dollar itself is a potential
disaster. The dollar is everywhere; it is held by countless
foreign institutions and individuals. It is estimated there
is well over $400 billion held abroad. If the depreciation
of the dollar causes a panic among those foreign holders,
the shift to other currencies would be a stampede.
Apparently, demand for many Japanese products is rela-
tively price inelastic. Despite the rising value of the yen
and resultant higher prices for Japanese products, American
demand for them has slackened only slightly. For example, in
comparison of the first nine months of 197 8 with the same
28

period in 1977 shows a decline in sales of imported Japanese
automobiles of less than one-half percent, from 984,2 57 to
979,674 cars. At the same time, American exports to Japan
have not increased significantly. The net result is a
worsening of the trade and payments imbalances, instead of
its amelioration, as would be expected through a readjust-
ment of exchange rates. In other words, at least in the
short-run, the yen revaluation means a higher, not a lower,
trade surplus for Japan.
The United States is urging three remedies on Japan.
First, stimulation of the Japanese economy through public
works or tax cuts. Increased demand could mitigate the
export drive, as well as open up markets for imported goods.
Second, setting of import targets, particularly since there
is a U.S. perception that Japan is unduly difficult for
foreign products to penetrate. Third, imposition of some
types of export restraint.
The bilateral trade agreement of January, 1978, had
mainly cosmetic effects. Though 300 items had tariff cuts
averaging 23 percent, most of these commodities are imported
by Japan in only a minimal quantity. Similarly, the
enlargement of import quotas was also minimal. The overall
impact on the U.S. — Japan trade imbalance will be slight.
In 1977, Japan promised a growth rate of 6.7 percent,
but, as mentioned earlier, grew only 5.1 percent. Japan
committed itself to a 7 percent growth rate for its fiscal
year ending in March, 1979. (The 7 percent rate is a minimum
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to stimulate domestic demand and to alleviate export pres-
sures.) Yet, leading private business associations in
Japan, such as the Federation of Economic Organizations, the
Federation of Employers' Associations, and the Committee for
Economic Development, have projected a growth rate of only
approximately 5 percent. Apparently, Japanese economic
growth will once again fall short of both needs and
expectations
.
According to the internationally known research firm
Arthur D. Little Company, there are no quick solutions to
the trade balance. Accords reached at various bargaining
tables recently will have little impact on the problem,
although such agreements may "reduce the symbolic signifi-
cance of the deficit as a disruptive influence in economic
relations between the two countries." Short-term actions
such as the reference price system for steel, orderly
marketing agreements, and special export purchasing missions
will yield little more than minimal relief to the imbalance.
In fact, total elimination of the U.S. deficit may be an
unrealistic goal.
By focusing on the immediate economic problem, Washing-
ton unwittingly may have started a potentially more danger-
ous political-economic process. By shaking Japan's
faith in America's goodwill, the United States may be
impelling Tokyo toward assuring itself markets and sources
of supply in the Pacific, along with a defense build-up — a
new version of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
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Sphere" for which it waged war against the United States
in 1941.
The dollar's value is now so low that some members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries are call-
ing for even higher prices to make up for the declining
value of their dollar reserves. Not only are those coun-
tries concerned about their dollar reserves, the fact that
the world oil prices are pegged in dollars means that
devaluation of the dollar is, in effect, a price/income
reduction for OPEC members. The weakness of the dollar
provides the motivation for OPEC ' s consideration of quoting
its prices in some other medium than the dollar.
The general decline and continued fluctuation in the
dollar's value have affected monetary dealings between
corporations. Many foreign exporters, fearing that they
will be stuck with depreciating dollars, now shun payments
in dollars. They try to avoid holding them or accepting
payment in them. As a result, American importers of
foreign supplies as well as retailers of imported goods are
saddled with the risks involved in contracts specifying pay-
ments in foreign currencies. The entire matter of how bills
are to be paid have become a subject of intense negotiation,
separate from traditional areas usually negotiated in a
business deal.
The dollar's decline has also affected the reported
earnings of corporation doing business abroad. The rising
value of other currencies against the U.S. dollar has had
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a favorable impact on the profitability of foreign opera-
tions for U.S. companies. Not only are foreign earnings
translated into dollars at current exchange rates, but so
are cash assets and liabilities. Yet, non-cash assets are
translated at historical currency rates when acquired.
Thus, whether financial statements are now a true repre-
sentation of a company's financial position in that
situation is open to question.
Of course, planning and budgeting for overseas invest-
ments and purchases are made much more difficult. The
forecasting involved now includes currency values, and a
more conservative approach is the likely result. Also,
companies not only have to worry about the dollar rising or
falling against other currencies, but fluctuations among
foreign monies themselves, apart from the dollar.
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IV. RESULTS AND REACTIONS
Domestically, the dollar's decline has virtually no
effect on the cost of food, housing, haircuts, or a United
States vacation. It does effect the cost of televisions,
radios, tape recorders, cameras, watches, motor vehicles,
and electronic equipment.
The devaluation may be weakening the United States
politically and economically. Foreigners are able to buy
premium American assets at bargain prices. If a basic
assumption has been that the dollar devaluation would lift
the U.S. economy, it has been proven incorrect for several
reasons.
First, although in most countries, currency devaluations
make imports discouragingly costly and exports encouragingly
cheap, this has not occurred in the United States. The
United States is not export-dependent, so exports form a
relatively small part of the national economy and also are
not easily expanded. Only a domestically powered recovery
will be effective. Besides, the United States is committed
to a free trade ideal and is hesitant to curb imports, which
have become so ingrained in some U.S. markets that the cur-




The sharp rise of the yen has brought a mixed bag of
blessings and ills to the Japanese economy. The higher yen,
to a very limited extent, means cheaper prices for Japanese
consumers, in the already limited import market, and pres-
sures for still further price cuts. The higher value has
also muted international critics of the Japanese government
who formerly complained that Japan had been rigging the
market to keep the yen's value lower in order to maintain
its international trade. But the yen's increased valuation
has frustrated the efforts of the government to get Japan's
lagging economy back into higher gear.
Although some Japanese politicians and economists,
including the leadership of the dominant Liberal Democratic
Party, believe the yen's steady climb will harm the economy,
there are some positive aspects which may, on balance, out-
weigh the negative effects. One effect is the acceleration
of a "restructuring" of Japanese industry, as took place in
the late 1940 's and sowed the seeds for Japan's dramatic
post-war recovery. This means the weeding out of non-
competitive sectors and enterprises which are forced either
out of business or into other product lines and survival of
only the most efficient and productive units
.
The radical dollar - yen revaluation has caused some
incongruities. For example, Japanese regulations, slow to
change, have kept plane tickets pegged at an old yen - dollar
rate of 300 to 1 and overseas phone calls at the even older
1971 rate of 360 to 1. The result is it costs a great deal
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more to call the United States from Japan rather than vice
versa, and a plane ticket is much more expensive when pur-
chased in Japan instead of the United States.
Concurrent with the attention given yen - dollar
fluctuations, the General Accounting Office determined that
the 22,000 Japanese national employees of U.S. Forces are
overpaid. This is besides the horror stories of Japanese
gate guards receiving more than U.S. colonels. Of course,
that phenomenon is attributable to the unrealistic exchange
rates — they do not reflect any semblance of purchasing
power (parity) . Despite anything the exchange rates may
purport to say regarding the pay of an American Colonel
and a Japanese guard, neither 's purchasing power in the
United States and Japan, respectively, is affected by any
comparisons to the other.
With that background, the GAO determined that the
Japanese workers are overpaid because they receive more pay
than Japanese civil service counterparts for comparable work
(All Japanese employees of U.S. Forces are also officially
Japanese civil servants, so they are considered "indirect
hire" foreign national employees.) Of course, the extra
pay is necessary in order to attract workers for U.S. Forces
All other things being equal, Japanese would rather work for
the Japanese government than the U.S. government. Add to
that natural inclination the entire American attitude toward
workers — impersonal, abrupt, propensity to lay-offs —
contrasted to Japanese employer attitudes bordering on
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paternalism. Finally, despite the alleged approximately
10 percent overpayment, it is still not enough to enable




As long as the Japanese domestic market remains slug-
gish, there is terrific pressure on industry to sell abroad.
In part, this is because of the paternal arrangements
between employers and employees that make layoffs and plant
shutdowns rare in times of recession. In a case where an
American factory might shut down or cut back, the Japanese
company is more likely to keep operating and attempt to
sell its products anywhere it can, at any price.
Many U.S. industrialists charge that this leads to the
dumping of Japanese goods on the American markets at below-
cost price, an act that violates U.S. trade laws. Over the
years, the U.S. government has shown a reluctance to
enforce these laws, both because these violations are often
difficult to prove and because such enforcement sometimes
has a deleterious effect on international trade and diplo-
matic relations.
The balance of trade problem between the United States
and Japan is creating major problems for the future between
the two nations. It is generating serious frustrations
among politicians and businessmen of both nations. Some
Japanese claim that racism accounts for what they insist is
greater U.S. pressure on Tokyo than on white European
nations to make trade concessions. At the same time, many
U.S. officials say Japan drags its heels when urged to
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reduce the huge trade imbalance, and that it is time that
Tokyo does more than talk.
The Japanese government's proposed budget for its
forthcoming fiscal year starting April 1, 1979, calls for
Japan to pay $160 million towards American military
expenses in Japan. This is a singular example of the
recognition by the Japanese government that the stationing
of American military forces in Japan is an important factor
and symbol of bilateral payments difficulties. This direct
contribution by Japan to the cost of U.S. Forces is unprec-
edented. The money will generally be earmarked for housing
construction on American bases. The high cost for American
military personnel of off-base housing has been one of the
most visible effects of the dollar devaluation in Japan.
Even to the Japanese, who have long considered trade
surpluses as insurance designed to offset their country's
dearth of natural resources, the recent galloping gains in
Japan's balance of international payments have proved
embarrassing. War-torn and demilitarized, postwar Japan
naturally viewed industrialization as a way to national
reconstruction and was eager to earn sufficient foreign cur-
rency through exports to import the technology and machinery
which would in turn lead to the export of more sophisticated
manufactured goods. It took Japan nine years to register
its first trade surplus in the postwar period. Until the
early 1960 's its balance of payments limped along, most of
the time falling into the red. Then, after several more
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years of zigzagging along the break-even point, the coun-
try's current account payment balances topped the one
billion dollar surplus mark in 1968, followed by the multi-
billion dollar bonanzas in 1971 and 1972. (See Table 8.)
However, just as it appeared that Japan's moderniza-
tion efforts had been rewarded with the attainment of the
status of full-fledged economic power, excess stimulation
of the economy and the oil crisis brought on heavy deficits.
The years from 1973 through 1975 saw the erosion of most of
the nation's past financial accumulations. The Japanese
people became perhaps overly sensitive about the "fragility"
of their country in view of its exasperating lack of
natural resources. For the Japanese nouveaux riches, the
era of luxury was over, and they scuttled back to their
accustomed style: hard work, production efficiency, and
export promotion. In 1976 their diligence once again paid
off with the return of a comfortable international payment
surplus. Few people foresaw that the surplus would swell
to gargantuan proportions the following year. (See Table
8.)
Japan's 1977 surplus of $11.1 billion soared far beyond
Germany's estimated $3.9 billion surplus, and contrasted
sharply with the deficits of the United Kingdom ($0.8
billion), France ($3 billion), the United States ($15.2
billion) , and the 24-member Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (a total of $32 billion). Japan's
black ink figures in such an ocean of red upset many of the
39

slumping oil-consuming countries and also baffled Japanese
economic planners who had been trying to balance their coun-
try's payments position by increasing imports through
domestic business stimulation.
Drawing up the budget for fiscal 1978 (April 1978 -
March 1979) was a new experience for Budget Bureau officials
of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and appropriations-seeking
officials of other ministries. Instead of MOF officials
swinging the budget-slashing axe and the ministries offer-
ing the usual resistance, MOF not only approved most
expenditure items proposed by each ministry but actually
asked some of them to come up with more. This extra-
ordinary state of affairs was due to the seven percent GNP
growth target for fiscal 1978 hurriedly set up in mid-
December of 1977 against the background of poor economic
showings and growing criticism from abroad that Japan was
not stimulating its economy sufficiently.
The result was a king-sized budget, providing for a
total expenditure of ¥34,295 billion ($171,475 million at
¥200 = $1), up a hefty 20.3 percent over the initial fiscal
1977 budget. In particular, the outlays for public works
projects were expanded by an all-time high of 34.5 percent
over the current fiscal year to ¥5,184 billion ($25,920
million) , in an effort to boost the economy by sparking
capital spending in the private sector. Although growing
more slowly than public works spending, expenditures for
social security, medical care and welfare programs and
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those for education and culture were also granted exactly
as requested by the various ministries. Treasury loans and
investments for FY 1978 were set at ¥-14,888 billion
($74,440 million), more than a quarter of which were appro-
priated for various construction work centering on houses,
highways and bridges
.
Faced with the compelling need to stimulate the eco-
nomy, MOF has apparently decided to temporarily set aside
the problem of the growing fiscal deficit. The government
will appropriate the prospective revenues for April and
May 1979 in advance as a part of fiscal 1978 revenues, and
will float ¥-10,985 billion ($54,925 million) in government
bonds, accounting for 32 percent of total annual expendi-
tures. Without the advance appropriation of April and May
1979 revenues, the dependence on bonds would be as high as
37 percent. However, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
rejected the income tax reduction strongly demanded by the
opposition parties, based on the belief that it would be
far less effective in boosting the economy than public
works
.
Defense expenditures grew 12.4 percent from the initial
fiscal .1977 budget to ¥1,901 billion ($9,505 million), as
the government decided to add the P3C and F15 — an anti-
submarine patrol plane and a fighter plane — to its force.
In addition, outlays for an array of new ships and planes
were allocated, "to stimulate defense-related industries"
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as a Defense Agency official explained when questioned
about the danger of snowballing defense spendings
,
A similar economy-stimulating budget is also in store
for the Japanese fiscal year starting in April, 1979.
Preliminary plans, for example, call for an additional




The United States went through a period of concern
regarding overseas expenditures in the 1960 's. At that
time, the problem was mainly concentrated in the expendi-
tures in Germany. It initially received attention in
1958 when the United States had its first post-war balance
of payments deficit. Concurrently, a movement began in
Congress to reduce American troop levels in Germany; the
proponents now had economic as well as political arguments.
In the early 1970 's this clamor for European troop
reductions disappeared. Whether it lost one of its prime
motivations in the anti-Viet Nam involvement, or the former
proponents gave up from frustration or a change in their
own convictions is unclear. But even with the recent
balance of payments deficits (more severe than those of the
late 1950's and early 1960's), there has not been another
refrain calling for troop reductions overseas. In fact,
the question in the government appears to be by how much
should the United States presence in Europe be increased.
U.S. forces in other overseas areas are not generally
included in any public discussion, so at least current
levels can generally be expected to continue.
Apparently, unlike fifteen years ago, reduction of the
United States military presence in foreign countries is no
longer considered a viable method of alleviating balance of
payments difficulties. This is particularly evidenced by

the reduction in the Department of Defense of the plethora
of reporting requirements and other instructions on the
topic of international balance of payments and overseas
expenditures. The most comprehensive Navy instructions on
the topic. Navy Comptroller Instruction 7020. lOE, had its
reporting and accounting requirements reduced from eight
reports and budget schedules to only three in 1970.
As mentioned earlier, the importance of the cost of
U.S. Forces in Japan in the United States-Japan balance
of payments difficulties has been recognized by the govern-
ment of Japan. The defense budget proposed by Japan
includes, for the first time, payment for the U.S. Forces.
The $160 million will be earmarked for housing construction
on U.S. bases.
Japanese yen and German marks are specifically men-
tioned in the Navy Comptroller Manual. Daily changes in
values of these currencies relative to the dollar are to be
effected on all yen or marks held by disbursing officers,
chargeable to the appropriation 17-6763, (Gains and Defi-
ciencies on Exchange Transactions, Navy). Thus, the local
disbursing officer finds the foreign currency in his posses-
sion has no permanent value, in terms of the dollar, a
situation that permeates all field activities and overseas
commands in the Defense Department.
For activities in Japan, the change to a floating
exchange rate in August, 1971, prompted a tripartite agree-
ment between U.S. Forces, Japan, military banking facilities,
44

and the Japanese government to fix the exchange rate each
day for yen purchased by military finance officers. The
daily fixed rate, based on the foreign exchange market
median rate for the preceding day, is used as the conver-
sion factor for yen payments and collections.
The fluctuating exchange rate difficulties are best
illustrated by the problems in accounting for foreign
national, indirect hire, employees. Obligations are
established by means of labor rates applied to hourly
labor distribution under the job order accounting system
(as is the procedure for all Navy activities worldwide)
.
In the case of Japan, the labor rates include wages paid
monthly, seasonal allowances paid in March, June, and
December of each year, annual pay raises which have been
consistently retroactive with adjustments paid when wage
modification is made to the Master Labor Contract with the
Japanese employees, and retirement allowances which are
accrued but paid only upon separation of employees. As the
level of the exchange rate fluctuates, adjustments are
necessary to labor rates for both future payments and
prior accruals. Somehow GAO hacked through this thicket to
conclude the Japanese employees are overpaid.
The wide fluctuations in the yen - dollar rate cause
inordinate revisions of labor rates which have dire effects
on financial plans as well as on estimates furnished
customers for reimbursable work or services. Similar uncer-
tainty exists on accurate dollar amounts for supplies and
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services procured from local open market sources since
purchase documents are stated, and payments made, in yen.
The overseas field activities are given a particular
rate against which to budget. That is, the major claimants
give their field activities an exchange rate which the
activities use in preparing their budget. Of course, this
method works only if the expenditures happen to occur at a
weighted average equal to that rate over the course of the
entire fiscal year. A comparison between the prescribed
rates in Table 3 9 and actual rates in Table 35 reveal the
wide range of disparities.
As the currency fluctuations become more severe, the
distortions in the budget become more pronounced. For
example, the initial budget call for fiscal year 1978 was
at ¥285 = $1. The field activities then received budget
authority for ¥-2 6 5 = $1. The rate was then changed to
¥•245 = $1 soon after the fiscal year began. Of course, the
actual rate has been significantly below that, usually
below ¥200 = $1. However, the major claimants had exhausted
their funds, and they could no longer supplement their over-
seas field activities' budgets. The result was the DOD
supplemental budget request to Congress to compensate for
the lowering value of the dollar.
Requesting additional funds when the exchange rate
deteriorates is the most common recourse for overseas
activities. This requirement for budget augmentations is
illustrated by the experience of the U.S. Naval Supply Depot
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in Yokosuka. In every fiscal year except one since 1970,
augmentations due to yen revaluations have been required.
(See Table 42.) Also a comparison between the budgeted ex-
change rate (in Table 42) and actual average exchange rate of
expenditures (in Table 41) reveals the primary area of
budgetary shortfalls for those Navy activities in Japan.
When this happens, a chain reaction, not easily halted or
modified, results in funding authority channels, despite
the fact that the situation may subsequently correct itself
by amelioration of the exchange rate. During the interim,
activities are not guaranteed relief and must revise finan-
cial plans, if possible, to compensate for the increased
costs. Funds administered under these conditions places an
unfair burden on all parties concerned and contributes to a
lack of control over programs. The opposite situation, an
improving exchange rate, could result in unusable funds or
foster unprogrammed spending, i.e., also a lack of control
and conformance with planned objectives.
In recent years, the net effects of currency fluctua-
tions has generally been deleterious to the Department of
Defense. That is, the dollar's value has generally declined,
and a budget based on a dollar at a given level suddenly has
unforeseen shortfalls. Yet, it is also conceivable that DOD
could in effect supplement its appropriations through gains




If expenditures are made at less favorable rates than
those budgeted, the Department of Defense must either seek
supplemental appropriations and reprogramming authority or
absorb the increased costs. This causes delays and uncer-
tainties in carrying out programs that the Congress,
through its approval of the budget, has indicated it wants
accomplished. In some instances, if enough funds are not
obtained through supplemental appropriations or reprogram-
ming, actual reductions in approved programs must be made.
As mentioned previously, gains attained from favorable
exchange rate fluctuations enable the Defense Department
to either offset unbudgeted costs or to finance unfunded,
i.e., unapproved, requirements. Although recent events
have not included this occurrence, a dollar rising in its
exchange value could have just as a disruptive effect on
the overseas budgetary process as a falling rate. The
budgetary control problem, though not the budgetary problem
itself, is in the fluctuation and change of the dollar's
rate, not the falling of that rate. The budgetary proce-
dure outlined below would avoid the two main effects of the
floating exchange rates; gains permitting the Department of
Defense to supplement its appropriations and losses
adversely affecting its overseas programs.
If a separate appropriation were established by author-
izing legislation, net exchange rate losses could be funded
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by that appropriation. Also, any gains from net favorable
exchange fluctuations would be deposited in miscellaneous
receipts. In this manner, the budgetary intent of Congress,
as expressed in dollars at a certain rate of exchange, would
not be undermined as can be the case at present.
Under this approach the U.S. Treasury would disburse
funds from a permanent appropriation as needed to cover
Defense Department exchange rate losses and would collect
exchange rate gain windfalls. The gains and losses for all
foreign currency transactions would be measured on the basis
of differences between exchange. The strain of the depre-
ciating dollar in fiscal year 1978 resulted in a supple-
mental budget request for the Department of Defense that
contained a significant amount attributable to currency rate
difficulties. In fact, while the supplemental request was
being considered, the sharp decline in the dollar's value
continued, particularly in terms of the yen and mark.
Initially, $121 million and $296 million, respectively, were
requested for pay increases to foreign nationals and for
other consequences of currency devaluation. This request
in January 1978 was based upon exchange rates in effect in
November 1977. By midsummer 1978, the $296 million was
revised upward to over $379 million ($379,132,000). The
additional costs in FY 1978 triggered by the declining
dollar amount to $519,788,000. Of this, $406.8 million
relate to the mark, $107.9 million to the yen, and $5.1
million to other foreign currencies. The difference
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between the actual costs incurred by the dollar's devalua-
tion and the amount of the request, $140.7 million, is
being absorbed by the Defense Department.
This change in budgeting for overseas activities would
be a basic recognition of the end of the era of fixed cur-
rency exchange rates. It is long overdue. The local
activities should not have the macro-economics of exchange
rates affect their day-to-day budget; they do not control or
cause them. The currency fluctuations are a matter that
require attention at a higher level since only those
higher levels can have any impact on them. The piper
should be paid there.
This acknowledgement of the importance of currency
fluctuations would insure the integrity of financial
management, result in positive control of funds for over-







According to the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development, as of mid-197 8 the world's economy
had a current-account balance of payment deficit of $50
billion. Of course, because there is no interplanetary
trade or banking, this is an impossibility, since the total
net balance must be zero. But this indicates the problem
with the compilation of statistics in this area.
Apparently, payments are recorded more scrupulously
than receipts. But this misbalanced attention to detail
can explain only a fraction of the $50 billion discrepancy.
Perhaps this reflects illegal payments, or funds diverted
to secret accounts. Also, some underdeveloped countries may
exaggerate their deficits in order to appear even poorer and
obtain more aid. Whatever the reason, it is cause not to
use these distorted statistics with a great deal of preci-
sion. The distortion is even more acute than $50 billion,
since the merchandise trade portion will generally yield a
surplus, because a country counts all items as an export
when they leave its shores, but the receiving nation does
not consider them an import until the items arrive. In
particular, the balance of trade and balance of payments
figures are constantly being revised. The annual figures
are still being revised up to seven years later for the bal-
ance of payments and three years later for balance of trade
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so any figures that are within those respective time frames
are truly only approximations and should not have projec-
tions applied to three decimal points. In this light, the
wide publicity given monthly trade figures, generally
released 30 days later, appears unwarranted. From the day
of their release until up to seven years later, those numbers
are being changed. The more recent the period, the less
reliable, ultimately, are the statistics.
These statistics can only offer trends and ranges, and
they lag significantly. Of course, trends are important, as
data may be relatively good while absolutely bad. Related
to this constant revision problem, different sources gave
widely varying figures. In hopes of gaining some shred of
uniformity, the U.S. Department of Commerce was used as the
source whenever its statistics were available. By exten-
sion, any other sources that have figures identical to
those of the Commerce Department's were then accepted as a
valid source for other statistics.
Another peculiarity does occur in connection with Com-
merce Department statistics; foreign military sales are not
considered merchandise trade and do not affect balance of
trade. Yet all other sources on international trade, includ-
ing other governments as well as international organizations,
do include foreign military sales as trade.
The tables are presented in an intuitively logical
sequence, which is not the same as the order in which the
text refers to them. Also, for the sake of completeness,
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several of the tables are compilations of the other tables,
but in different and other common comparisons. This is
included as a convenience to the reader.
Finally, Department of Defense sources are generally
by fiscal year (July to June until 1976, October to
September thereafter) . Commerce Department and inter-
national organizations' sources are generally by calendar
year (January to December) , and Japanese government sources
are generally by Japanese fiscal year (April to March)
.
Trends, comparisons, and forecasts from different sources




All amounts are in millions of U.S.
dollars unless otherwise stated
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1978 (JAN. -JUNE) -10210
SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC




U.S. BALANCE OF TRADE
(DATA INCLUDING F.M.S. IN PARENTHESES)
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS NET
1968 33626 C35018) 32291 + 635 C+2027)
1969 36^+1^ C37942) 35807 + 607 C + 2135)
1970 ^2469 C^3970) 39866 +2603 ( + ^+10^4)
1971 '+3319 C^52i+5) ^+5579 -2260 C- 33^)
1972 49381 C50544) 55797 -6^+16 C-5253)
1973 71410 C73752) 70499 + 911 C+3253)
1974 98306 (101258) 103673 -5567 (-2415)
1975 107088 (111007) 98041 +9047 (+12966)
1976 114694 (119913) 124047 -9353 (-4134)
1977 120585 (127664) 151644 -31059 (-23980)
1978 (JAN. -SEPT.) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) -22670 (N/A)




U.S. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES












SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NOTE: FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ARE NOT CONSIDERED PART OF
MERCHANDISE TRADE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND
CONSEQUENTLY NOT INCLUDED IN EXPORT STATISTICS.
HOWEVER, OTHER NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SOURCES
DO CONSIDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AS MERCHANDISE






















































U.S. VS. JAPAN BALANCE OF TRADE















































































U.S. VS. GERMANY BALANCE OF TRADE
CDATA INCLUDING F.M.S. IN PARENTHESES)
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1968 1639 C1870) 2724 -1085 ( -854)
1969 2005 C2298) 2628 -622 ( -330)
1970 2651 C2845) 3156 -505 ( -311)
1971 2559 C3148) 3680 -1121 ( -532)
1972 2732 C2943) 4308 -1576 (-1365)
1973 3750 (4066) 5591 -1841 (-1525)
1974 4687 (5132) 6302 -1615 (-1170)
1975 5052 (5425) 5358 -306 ( +67)
1976 5389 (5711) 5581 -192 ( +130)
1977 5829 (6216) 7241 -1412 (-1025)


















SOURCE: THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRALIA
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND













































SOURCE: DRESDNER BANK, STATISTICAL SURVEY





GERMANY BALANCE OF TRADE
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1968 248^1 20152 + 4589
1959 29052 24926 + 4125
1970 34139 29814 + 4324
1971 39034 34341 + 4593
1972 46202 39776 + 5426
1973 68571 55499 +13072
197^ 90590 70240 +20350
1975 916 2 75519 +15001
1976 101977 88209 +13768
1977 118963 102251 +16712































+ 1048 + 2964
+ 2119 + 2049
+ 1970 + 876
+ 5797 + 943




+ 3576 + 3379
+11053 + 3874
+ 4005 N/A
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT





COMPARATIVE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
U.S. JAPA.M GERMANY
OVERALL WITH JAPAN WITH GERMANY OVERALL OVERALL
1958 + 521 -1389 -1679 + 1048 +2954
1969 + 406 -1770 -1299 + 2119 +2049
1970 + 2360 -1563 +1270 + 1970 + 876
1971 - 1407 -3500 -1897 + 5797 + 943
1972 - 5979 -4807 -3174 + 6624 + 773
1973 + 6885 -1459 -3850 - 135 +4253
1974 + 1719 - 944 -3301 + 4693 +10427
1975 +18445 -1220 -1584 - 578 +3575
1976 + 4339 -5402 - 616 + 3675 +3379
1977 -15221 -8134 -2471 +11053 +3874
1978 - 5466 -3208 N/A + 4005 N/A
Cjan.-
MAR. )
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT




COMPARATIVE BALANCES OF TRADE
CU.S. DATA INCLUDING F.M.S.
IN PARENTHESES)
YEAR U.S
1968 + 635 C+ 2027)
1969 + 607 C+ 2135)
1970 + 2603 C+ 4104)
1971 + 2260 C- 334)
1972 - 6416 C- 5253)
1973 + 911 C+ 3253)
1974 - 5357 C- 2415)
1975 + 9047 C+12966)
1976 - 9353 C- 4134)
1977 -31059 C-23980)
1978 CJAN.- -22670 C N/A )
SEP.)
NOTE: JAPAN AND GERMANY DATA INCLUDE F.M.S.
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
DRESDNER BANK, STATISTICAL SURVEY
JAPAN GERMANY
-16 + 4689
+ 965 + 4125
+ 507 + 4324
+ 4423 + 4693
+ 5174 + 6426































































































































































U3 .— LA UD CN CN
1^ -:1- 1^ O o-i r-H














r^ /-N /--N /-N ^-N ^^ r—
\
r-\ /^ /^ /^














J- i-H r-H 1—
t
LA r^ rA
^_/ v-y v_/ ^-^ >—
^
^_/ ^^ ^_/ v_/
1 1
o <£> J- LA rA <Ti o o LA J- J-
CN (-H J- CN .—
(
O o^ CT> rA co rA
i-H ^ CM CN r—
1






















r\ /-N r^ /'-N /-N /^N /-^ /—S r^ /-> /-\
r^ LA J- J- rA rA LA OD J- O UD
CM rA o rA LA LA 1—1 OD rA CO r-»O 1—1 1—1 rA CN CM J- a-> i-H cn C^J
CM CN ^ LA rA CM CN J- rA cn
+ + + 1 1 + 1 1—
(
1 CM





LA r^ rA o MD 1—
(
l~^ r~- rA en 1—1
hA o o 03 1—
1
1—1 03 -3- LA LA rA
l£) ^X5 U3 CN J- cn rA O rA o r—
(
CM CM <-D LA cn o-i r—i (—1








Qi oo cn o 1—
I
CN rA
-r LA OD r-^ CO
< OD u3 r^ r^ rv. r^ r^ r^ r^ r~^ r^
UJ cn cn cn O cn cn cn cn o^ G-i cn













































































































































































































r^ /-N /-\ /-> /"s ,'-> r\ r^
O LA LA LA J- rA CM rA
CO CTi r-^ a~i O o r«« o
a^ J- O o o J- r^ >-o
CM hA ^ J- LA CO o o^





















































































































CO CTI O .—
1
CM rA J- LA OD r^ CO <

















































































r\ /-\ /^ r^ ,^\ /^ /-\ r^ rs r\
o CO LA CO t^ U3 CN LA r—
4
U3
i^ o~i ^ J- J- OD K> CM 1—1 1—1





1—1 CM CM I^ CM -3- LA LA LA ^D
"^ ^-^ v_/ v_/ v_/ v^ \^ \^ \^ ^^
a^ tX) r-H o-' CM O r-^ CM CTi c-i
rA o LA LA r^ LA CO LA 00 CM
lD o lD LA 1^ r- lD O rA oo
^H CM CM CM CM rA J- LA LA LA
CM <X> J- 1—1 vX3 en O CTi a-" 1—
t
LA CN r-4 -3- r^ en -J- 1—1 o LA
1—1 cn oo rA r~. J- CM <X) CM CMO J- cr> J- a^ LA O LA CO CM
CM CM CM ^A rA LA r^ r-« CO O
/-^ r-N ^~s /•^ r^
O LA LA LA -d-
00 CT^ Pv. en o
cn J- lD o o
CM hA J- J- LA
v^ ^^ v-/ v-/ ^>^
^'~\ /^ /-N /~\ r\
CM hA r>>
-:J- 00
[^ o PA cn CM
r^ UD CM LA U3









en r-- O PA PA U3 J- r-N. iX) 1— en
J- r-^ LA LA '^ LA CM lQ en >-o 1—1
en cr lO O o-i PA r^ LA 1—
(
LA 03
CM PA J J- J- CO o o-i o O CN







1— CO -d- 1—1
en O OO lO ^ PA 1— CO p^ J-









CM PA 03 LA 03 03
J- CO OD O CO ^H CM CO t—i 1—
CN CM LA CO o en o LA CO -3-
r^ 03 1—
(
03 PA LA PA .^ LA o<j
CM CM PA PA
-r LA 03 LA LA p^
CTi PA j- 00 o LA -3- P^ f—* LA PA
OD en CT^ p^ pv. 03 r—
I
LA PA
-r LAO CO CO CM o 03 J- CN LA LA r-«.
-3-
-r LA P^ o^ en CM r-H LA 00 LA
1—1 r-. 03 CT^ p-« CJ^ PA r—
<
r^ J- 03
CTI o 03 P-^ en en r-v. J- J- J- cn
CTi CO 00 LA p^ J- o3 o o 03 CO
CN LA CTI LA LA o PA oo J- --1 1—1




CO en o 1— CM PA ^ LA 03 p-^ CO < <






























U.S. MILITARY EXPENDITURES OVERSEAS
YEAR AMOUNT
GERMANY JAPAN TOTAL
1968 878 781 4535
1969 9^+8 880 4856
1970 1081 918 4855
1971 1265 869 4819
1972 lif05 839 4784
1973 1507 824 4629
1974 15^+9 758 5032
1975 15if0 765 4795
1976 1557 792 4901
1977 1860 811 5745
1978 N/A 220 1548
C JAN. -MAR.
)


















































"FOREIGN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN U.S
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE





























SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE






YEAR EXPENSES COUNTER NET
1968 16 11 - 5
1959 19 26 + 7
1970 21 23 + 2
1971 18 35 + 17
1972 22 23 + 1
1973 25 65 +^l
197i+ 29 20 - 9
1975 31 22 - 9
1976 28 23 - 5
1977 ttS 31 -15
1978 (JAN. -MAR ) 8 8 —








21 12 - 9























U.S. PETROLEUM NET IMPORTS
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS NET
1968 50if 2384 -1880
1969 i+78 2649 -2171
1970 519 2930 -2415
1971 511 3650 -3139
1972 ^+88 4650 -4162
1973 605 8415 -7810
197^+ 851 26589 -25738
1975 986 27017 -26031
1976 1078 34573 -33495
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U.S. - GERMANY TRAVEL
EXPENSES













































INDEXED FOR EACH COUNTRY AT 1970
YEAR U.S. JAPAN GERMANY
1968 89.6 75.7 80.
1969 94.9 85.9 87. 1
1970 100 . 100 . 100.0
1971 106. 3 114, 7 111.0
1972 113.4 132.4 120 .9
1973 121.4 157.5 133.5
1974 131.2 196.6 147. 1
1975 143.2 229.9 158 . 7
1976 154.2 259. 1 168.8
1977 167.5 284.8 180. 7






INDEXED FOR EACH COUNTRY AT 1967






































G.N. P. ANNUAL GROWTH
(WITH DEFLATOR)































ANNUAL PER CENT RISE
YEAR U.S. JAPAN GERMANY WORLD
5.^% 2 .,5% t+.9%


































SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND





INDEXED FOR EACH COUNTRY AT 1970























































SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
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JAPANESE EXPORTS TO U.S.
C% OF TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.)






1926 8 2% k% 30i+
igifO 66% h% 6% 133
1950 10% 9% 11% 179
1960 2 6% 7% 17% 1083
1976 11% 2 7% 2 1% 15651
In any of the above years, the amount of any commodity,
other than the ones listed was negligible. For those years
where a listed commodity has no percentage given, the amount
of that commodity that year was also negligible.




U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN
C% OF EXPORTS TO JAPAN)
COTTON MACHINERY FOOD RAWMATERIAL TOTAL C$ M)
1926 i+7% 10, 126
19^0 lh% 12% 1,545
1950 52% 26% 417
1960 14% 17% 8% 17% 291
1976 2 2% 26% 319
In any of the above years, the amount of any commodity,
other than the ones listed was negligible. For those years
where a listed commodity has no percentage given, the amount
of that commodity that year was also negligible.




NUMBER OF COMMODITY ITEMS UNDER RESIDUAL IMPORT











































ITEMS UNDER RESIDUAL IMPORT
RESTRICTION IN JAPAN
Items under residual import restriction in Japan are not
prohibited entirely but are regulated by quotas which may vary
from year to year.
Beef
Fresh milk and cream
Processed milk and cheese
Processed cheese
Canned beef, pork, etc.
Fresh shore fish and cod roe
Salted shore fish and cod roe
Scallops, shell ligaments and
squid (fresh and salted)
Fresh oranges and tangerines
Oranges and tangerines for
temporary storage
Fruit purees and fruit paste
Canned pineapple and fruit pulp
Fruit juice and tomato juice




Wheat flour, rice flour, etc.
Ground wheat, ground rice, etc.
Red beans, broad beans, peas, etc.
Peanuts (except those for oil extrac-
tion)
Devil's tongue taro
Food preparations (sweetener, milk,
edible seaweed, wheat, etc.)
Coal
Cowhide and horsehide
Dyed, colored and/or patterned sheepskin
Dyed, colored and/or patterned goatskin
Leather footwear











































1971 35.9 360 360
1972 35.6 360 315
1973 39.3 300 260
197i+ 50.3 300 276
1975 57.6 300 293
1976 73.0 300 298
197T 17.8 300 278
1977 76. 1 29 - 26 5" 278
1978 92. 8 245 22t+
JAN. -J UNE
"RATE REVISED DURING THE FISCAL YEAR































































AUTHORIZATIONS, NOT EXPENDITURES, 50 CURRENCY REVALUATIONS
IN SUCCEEDING YEARS DO HAVE AN EFFECT.
"MAY STILL NEED REVALUATIONS.





FOREIGN LABOR COSTS AT THE U.S
NAVAL BASE, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN





1968 $ 1. 19 ^36 0/$ 1 7.90
1959 1.29 It 8.00
1970 1.50 1! 10. 20




1973 3.95 ¥2 50/$ 1 10.68
197^+ i+.68 ¥276/$l 15.39
1975 5.71 ¥293/$l 32.i+8
1976 7.^+0 ¥298/$l 10 .85
1977 7.98 ¥2 7 8/$ 1 6.9^+
1978 11.08 ¥2 2'+/$l 5,92
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